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Abstract

This field experiment investigated whether purposefully adopting a new pro-environmental
behavior (e.g., unplugging appliances, reusing shopping bags) led to positive spillover by
altering people’s subsequent pro-environmental behaviors and political attitudes. Participants (N
= 125) recruited through community organizations were randomly assigned to either adopt a new
pro-environmental behavior of their choice for three weeks, or were not invited to do so.
Behavior adoption increased participants’ likelihood of contacting their Senator about climate
change, but had little direct spillover effect on other individual pro-environmental behaviors,
their likelihood of making household-wide changes, the political importance they placed on
climate-related issues, or their support for emissions-reducing policies. Behavior adoption
increased sense of environmental responsibility among some participants, leading to indirect
positive effects on purchasing organic/local produce and policy support. Overall, observed
positive spillover effects were limited and relatively small. There was little indication that
behavior adoption led to any meaningful negative spillover effects.

Keywords: pro-environmental behavior; behavior change; attitudes; spillover; environmental
responsibility
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Can’t Hurt, Might Help: Examining the Spillover Effects from Purposefully Adopting a New
Pro-Environmental Behavior
We all have behaviors that we want to change, whether to quit biting our nails or to be
nicer to that one annoying relative during the holidays. More and more, people are also working
to change their behaviors to become more environmentally-friendly: We try to remember to
bring reusable bags to the store or to cook more vegetarian recipes. There is already a wealth of
research explaining what predicts whether someone will perform a pro-environmental behavior
(PEB), and on the best ways to instigate that behavior change (for meta-analyses, see Bamberg &
Möser, 2007; Osbaldiston & Schott, 2012). One issue that should be examined more closely is if
purposefully adopting a new individual PEB influences people’s other behaviors and political
attitudes relevant to the environment. “Purposeful adoption,” refers to personally deciding to
start performing a new PEB, and “individual PEB” refers to the type of small PEB in one’s life
that needs to be continually enacted, rather than a one-time behavior.
Evidence of Spillover
When examining how the performance of a PEB affects other PEBs, researchers find it
can sometimes lead to “positive spillover” meaning increased performance of subsequent PEBs,
and other times lead to “negative spillover” meaning reduction in performance of subsequent
PEBs (for reviews, see Nilsson, Bergquist, & Schultz, 2017; Thøgersen & Crompton, 2009;
Truelove, Carrico, Weber, Raimi, & Vandenbergh, 2014).
When an intervention induces people to perform a particular PEB such as installing a
low-flow shower head, reusing towels in a hotel room, purchasing environmentally-friendly
products, or bringing reusable bags to the store, researchers often find that this initial PEB
increases the likelihood that people perform subsequent PEBs (Baca-Motes, Brown, Gneezy,
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Keenan, & Nelson, 2013; Hutton, 1982; Lanzini & Thøgersen, 2014; Thomas, Poortinga, &
Sautkina, 2016). Other research in which people are reminded of their past PEBs also
demonstrates that this can increase their performance of subsequent PEBs (Cornelissen,
Pandelaere, Warlop, & Dewitte, 2008; van der Werff, Steg, & Keizer, 2013; 2014a).
Correlational research often finds that those who perform more PEBs are also likely to
demonstrate stronger political attitudes about environmental issues in terms of political concern
and support for environmental policies (Stern, Dietz, Abel, Guagnano, & Kalof, 1999; Thøgersen
& Noblet, 2012). For example, consistently boycotting non-environmental products or
purchasing environmentally-friendly products are both related to greater traditional political
engagement and activist behavior (Gotlieb & Wells, 2012; Willis & Schor, 2012). Evidence also
suggests that past PEBs are likely to spill over into stronger political attitudes in certain
conditions, such as if people are directly labeled as “environmentalists” in conjunction with their
past PEB performance (Lacasse, 2016).
There are also relatively fewer examples of an initial PEB leading to subsequent
reduction in other PEBs. A water conservation intervention successfully reduced water use while
simultaneously leading to an uptick in electricity use, although differences between the
intervention and control conditions disappeared after the feedback portion of intervention was
removed (Tiefenbeck, Staake, Roth, & Sachs, 2013). Additionally, a panel study found evidence
that initial PEBs led to some positive and some negative spillover into subsequent PEBs
(Thøgersen & Olander, 2003). Performing a one-time PEB or reminding people of their past
PEBs can also reduce support for environmental policies (Werfel, 2017), particularly in liberals
in certain circumstances (Lacasse, 2015; Truelove, Yeung, Carrico, Gillis, & Raimi, 2016).
Spillover Mechanisms

CAN’T HURT MIGHT HELP

5

These disparate findings have been explained by examining the motivations and
psychological mechanisms underlying the performance of the initial PEB. For one, people’s
attributions of the cause of their initial PEB will likely impact spillover (Lacasse, 2013;
Thøgersen & Crompton, 2009; Truelove et al., 2014). If the initial PEB is perceived to be
externally-motivated (i.e., due to an external reward or social pressure), it may interrupt intrinsic
motivation and therefore reduce the likelihood of other PEBs or changes in one’s environmental
political attitudes. Alternately, when people perceive the initial PEB is internally-motivated, it
may boost aspects of intrinsic motivation and increase likelihood of further PEBs. If the behavior
is performed for internal, non-environmental reasons (e.g., to save money, to improve health),
spillover to other PEBs or environmental political attitudes is not expected because the initial
behavior was not connected to the environment. Several studies have found that these
motivations are important for spillover to occur (Carrico, Raimi, Truelove, & Eby, 2017;
Steinhorst, Klöckner, & Matthies, 2015; Steinhorst & Matthies, 2016), although others found
some evidence of positive spillover even with external incentives (Lanzini & Thøgersen, 2014).
In terms of psychological mechanisms, theoretically negative spillover is likely when the
initial PEB was performed to alleviate some negative affect, such as guilt due to harming the
environment or fear of environmental disaster (Truelove et al., 2014). Once the PEB is
performed, the negative feeling will subside and further PEBs or strong environmental political
attitudes are less likely since the affective motivation for helping the environment is removed.
Positive spillover is theoretically more likely when performance of the first PEB is role-based,
such as to live up to a goal or obligation, or to maintain one’s status as a self-identified
environmentally-concerned person (Lacasse, 2013; Thøgersen & Crompton, 2009; Truelove et
al., 2014). In terms of goals and obligations, performing one PEB can alter people’s cognitive

CAN’T HURT MIGHT HELP

6

evaluations of their ability and their obligation to take action on environmental problems, making
stronger political attitudes and future PEBs more likely. In terms of self-oriented processes,
performing one PEB can alter how people view themselves and strengthen their environmental
convictions, leading them to display stronger political attitudes and further PEBs.
For these reasons, purposeful adoption of a PEB is a scenario in which positive spillover
is more likely than negative spillover. Purposeful adoption is generally internally-motivated,
stemming from a personal desire to become more environmentally-friendly. Negative affect
could potentially be a motivator, but since purposeful adoption requires repeated performance of
the PEB, it is more likely a role-based decision. The question then remains: What is the rolebased mechanism that leads to this positive spillover?
Environmental responsibility. Theories of altruistic behavior such as norm-activation
theory (Schwartz, 1973) and its later expansion value-belief-norm theory (Stern et al., 1999)
have commonly been applied to PEBs. These theories focus on people’s cognitive beliefs,
positing that altruistic behaviors occur when someone’s personal norm is activated. The personal
norm activation is due to some combination of belief that something of importance is being
harmed (awareness of consequences) and belief that he/she has the ability to take meaningful
action to avert that harm (ascription of responsibility). Although these beliefs and norms are each
often treated as separate constructs, they overlap quite a bit and are not necessarily interpreted as
unique or separate ideas among the general public. Researchers themselves have used the
multiple terms such as “personal norm,” “moral obligation,” and “obligation-based intrinsic
motivation” to refer to very similar constructs (Barbarossa & De Pelsmacker, 2016; Harland,
Staats, & Wilke, 1999; van der Werff et al., 2013). Additionally, a study of the predictors of
environmental behavior that measured both the belief in one’s ability to effectively address
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environmental problems and personal norms to perform PEBs found that this belief was very
closely linked to personal norms, and both factors led to greater PEBs (Harland, Staats, & Wilke,
2007). Therefore, this set of cognitive evaluation processes including belief in one’s ability and
obligation to help the planet will be referred to as “environmental responsibility” and will be
measured as a single construct as a potential spillover mechanism.
In terms of spillover, the initial PEB can boost one’s environmental responsibility, which
then can positively spill over into future PEBs and political attitudes. Indeed, some PEB spillover
research has found that environmental responsibility mediates positive spillover from one PEB to
another (Steinhorst et al., 2015; van der Werff et al., 2013). For example, an intervention aimed
at increasing electricity conservation intentions also led to a boost in environmental
responsibility, which in turn led to greater intentions to perform individual PEBs such as eating
less meat as well as political PEBs such as signing a climate protection petition (Steinhorst et al.,
2015).
Environmental centrality. Alternately, processes related to the self and to the personal
environmental convictions such as environmental identity and attitude strength have also been
applied to spillover between PEBs. People aim to maintain a positive view of themselves, and
when environmental concerns are central to their identity or they hold strong environmental
attitudes, they will likely remain consistent and act in multiple ways to help the environment.
Self-perception theory suggests that performing a new behavior can alter the way we see
ourselves, and this new self-perception (e.g., boost in environmental identity) is likely to
influence future behaviors (Bem, 1972; Truelove et al., 2014). Similarly, there are many
interrelated dimensions to attitude strength, including several elements related to attitude
centrality such as how personally important the attitude is and how representative the attitude is
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of one’s personal values (Holland, Verplanken, & Knippenberg, 2002; Krosnick, Boninger,
Chuang, Berent, & Carnot, 1993). Outwardly performing behaviors that demonstrate one's
personal commitment to a cause can strengthen attitudes towards the cause itself (Holland et al.,
2002). Since strong attitudes largely stem from sense of self, attitude strength overlaps with
environmental identity. Indeed, items used to measure environmental identity often ask about
people’s self-concept (e.g., Poortinga, Whitmarsh, & Suffolk, 2013), but also often include items
relevant to attitude strength such as the importance of environmental behaviors to the self (e.g.,
van der Werff, Steg, & Keizer, 2014b). Therefore, this set of similar self-oriented processes
including environmental identity and attitude strength will be referred to as “environmental
centrality” and will be measured as a single construct as a potential spillover mechanism.
Research indicates that performing PEBs often increases one’s environmental centrality
(Poortinga et al., 2013; van der Werff, Steg, & Keizer, 2014a; 2014b). Additionally,
environmental centrality is a predictor of consistency across PEBs (Gatersleben, Murtagh, &
Abrahamse, 2014; Whitmarsh & O’Neill, 2010) and links individual PEBs to political attitudes
such as support for environmental policies (Lacasse, 2015; 2016). Therefore, strong
environmental centrality should feed into consistency processes that lead to positive spillover.
Environmental responsibility and environmental centrality processes represent different
types of mechanisms, but they are somewhat related. For example, one study found that
strengthening one’s environmental identity can also heighten one’s sense of responsibility and
thereby lead to more PEBs (van der Werff et al., 2013). This research indicates that
environmental responsibility is a more proximal predictor of PEBs than is environmental
centrality, but the mechanisms are likely to both work simultaneously.
Current Research
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The goal of the present study was to examine how purposefully adopting a new PEB can
spill over into a wide range of other PEBs and political attitudes. The focus on purposeful
adoption differs from past spillover research, which largely focused on the spillover effects from
a behavior intervention aimed at changing a particular PEB chosen by the researchers (BacaMotes et al., 2013; Carrico et al., 2017; Hutton, 1982; Lanzini & Thøgersen, 2014; Margetts &
Kashima, 2017; Steinhorst & Matthies, 2016; Thomas et al., 2016; Tiefenbeck et al., 2013;
Truelove et al., 2016) and from interventions that reminded people of their past PEBs
(Cornelissen, Pandelaere, Warlop, & Dewitte, 2008; Lacasse, 2015; 2016; van der Werff et al.,
2013; 2014a). In this study, participants purposefully adopted a new PEB of their choice to
examine how this more internally-motivated and repeatedly performed action impacted their
subsequent PEBs and political attitudes. Rather than manipulating PEBs in the lab or asking
participants to reflect upon their past PEBs, this field experiment had participants integrate the
new PEB into their daily lives for three weeks. Another strength is that this study measured
change in participants’ PEBs and political attitudes through employing pretest and posttest
questionnaires, a more precise way of measuring spillover than simply comparing experimental
conditions on posttest scores. Finally, the study included two distinct methods of tracking
participants’ PEB adoption: message response tracking and self-report calendar tracking.
Although neither tracking method was intended to influence participants, the two conditions
were created as a check, just in case method of tracking differentially impacted outcomes.
This study measured a wide range of PEBs (individual PEBs that are performed
repeatedly, household PEBs that involve making a one-time change with lasting benefits,
political behaviors to support climate-related issues) and political attitudes (importance of
climate-related issues in politics, support for emissions-reducing policies) to examine the range
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of areas where spillover could occur, with a specific focus on politically-oriented behaviors and
attitudes that are less frequently included in spillover research. Political behaviors and attitudes
are particularly important since collective political actions and policy changes are a necessary
piece to address large-scale environmental issues such as climate change. The study also
examined two possible mechanisms through which adopting a PEB might lead to spillover.
Specifically, it investigated if adopting a new PEB influenced people’s sense of environmental
responsibility and/or environmental centrality and if these in turn explained subsequent changes
in PEBs and political attitudes. Therefore, the following two hypotheses were tested:
H1: Purposefully adopting a new PEB will lead to an increase in PEBs and strengthen
political attitudes as compared to a control condition in which participants are not invited to
adopt a new PEB.
H2: These positive spillover effects will be mediated by increased environmental
responsibility and by increased environmental centrality.
Method
Outline of Research Design
This was a mixed between-and-within-subjects experimental design (see Figure 1). All
participants first completed a pretest questionnaire, followed by the experimental manipulation.
Participants were randomly assigned to (1) the control condition, (2) behavior adoption with
message response tracking (BAM condition), or (3) behavior adoption with self-report calendar
tracking (BAC condition). The manipulation asked participants in BAM or BAC conditions to
adopt a new PEB for a three-week span, and those in the control condition were not invited to
actively adopt a new behavior. At the end of the three-week span, all participants completed a
posttest questionnaire.
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Participants
Adult residents of central Massachusetts were recruited through various social
organizations such as hobby clubs, civic organizations, and recreational sports teams. To help
avoid selection-bias towards environmentally concerned individuals, it was advertised as a study
on political attitudes and daily behaviors. Participants volunteered in return for a $5 donation to
their organization. One hundred and sixty-five participants completed the pretest questionnaire,
147 participated in the experimental manipulation, and 141 completed the posttest questionnaire.
Additionally, nine participants from behavior adoption conditions reported performing
their adopted PEB less than 50% of the time. Since behavior adoption was the variable of
interest manipulated by the experimental conditions, these participants were removed from
further analysis. After participant dropout and removal, those who reported that climate change
was likely or very likely not occurring were not equally spread across conditions, leaving only
one such participant in a behavior adoption condition and six in the control condition. To ensure
that all conditions were similar in climate change belief, these seven participants were removed
from further analysis, limiting the dataset to those who indicated that climate change was likely
or very likely occurring. The final dataset included 125 participants: 39 in the control condition,
45 in the BAM condition, and 41 in the BAC condition.
Demographic information was collected on the pretest questionnaire, including gender,
age, political party, education on a range from 1 (junior high school) to 8 (doctoral, law, or
medical degree), and political orientation by asking participants, “How would you describe your
political orientation?” on a range from 1 (Extremely liberal) to 7 (Extremely conservative;
Lacasse, 2015). Of the remaining 125 participants, 59% were male and 41% female, ranging
from ages 22-84 (M = 54.86, SD = 13.73). Most of the participants were White (97%) and highly
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educated (M = 7.08, SD = 1.24). Forty-four percent were Democrats, 21% were Republicans,
and 35% had no political party, and the sample was somewhat liberal-leaning (M = 3.43, SD =
1.68). The participants who dropped out or were removed did not significantly differ from the
remaining participants in gender, race, or educational attainment, ps ≥ .24. However, those who
dropped out or were removed were significantly younger [M = 49.18, SD = 15.39; t (161) =
2.19, p = .03]. They also significantly differed in political party, and specifically were less likely
to be Democrats and more likely to be Republicans [28% Democrats; 43% Republicans, 30% no
political party; χ2 (2, N = 165) = 7.78, p = .020]. They were also marginally significantly more
politically conservative [M = 4.05, SD = 1.84; t (157) = 1.98, p = .05]. These differences impact
interpretation of the study’s findings by limiting their generalizability.
Prettest and Posttest Questionnaires
The measures listed below were all included on both the pretest and posttest
questionnaires unless otherwise indicated. These measures are a subset from a larger study about
changes in environmental values, attitudes, and behaviors. The individual items for each scale
are listed on Table 1A in the supplementary materials, and all means and standard deviations for
measures are listed on Table 2. All measures were created by the author unless otherwise cited.
PEB and political attitude spillover measures.
Individual PEBs. This measure presented 12 individual PEBs, and only included PEBs
that could be regularly performed at least several times per week. Participants rated how often
they performed each on a scale: 1 (Almost never), 2 (Rarely), 3 (Sometimes), 4 (Often), and 5
(Almost always). There is imprecision with these kinds of frequency word-anchors, and wordanchors such as “once a day” or “once a month” offer more precise measurements (Newstead &
Collis, 1987). However, the PEBs on the measure vary greatly in how many times per day the
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opportunity to perform them arises (e.g., opportunities to turn off the lights may arise 20 times
per day, whereas opportunities to take 10-minute showers arise approximately once per day).
Therefore, rather than asking participants to report the actual number of times per day they
performed the PEB (which would widely vary across items), these word-anchors were chosen
because they allow participants to think about how often they performed a PEB when they had
the opportunity, providing a response that would be more comparable across items.
However, the 12 PEBs did not create a reliable scale. Instead, each item was analyzed
individually. Since many BAM and BAC participants chose one of the PEBs on this measure to
adopt for the three-week span (e.g., turn off the lights, take 10-minute showers), their scores for
this behavior would be expected to increase due to their adoption of the behavior, not due to
spillover. To avoid artificially inflating the posttest spillover scores, all BAM and BAC
participants who adopted a particular behavior were removed before analysis on that behavior
was conducted (e.g., those who adopted “turning off the lights” were removed from the analysis
of spillover on the “turning off the lights” individual PEB item).
Household PEBs. This scale presented six household-level PEBs and included behaviors
that required a one-time action or purchase that would help reduce emissions continuously. Since
there was only a small chance that participants would make a large purchase or change to their
home in the three-week span of the study, likelihood of making household changes was
measured instead. Participants rated how likely they were to perform each PEB in the next five
years on a scale from 1 (Very unlikely) to 7 (Very likely) with an option to indicate if they had
already completed the PEB in the past five years. Many participants indicated that they had
already performed three of the PEBs: (1) had an energy audit, (2) installed an item to make their
home more energy efficient, and (3) purchased a product to reduce water usage in their home.
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Therefore, these three items were analyzed individually. The other three items were averaged to
make a scale, pretest α = .76, posttest α = .72.
Political behaviors. This scale listed five political PEBs that could be taken to address
the issue of climate change. Participants indicated if they had performed the PEB at all in the last
5 years with either a “yes” or “no.” Very few participants indicated that they had “Participated in
a protest, rally, or other kind of public demonstration about climate change,” and so this item did
not contribute to the reliability of the scale. The scale was made by averaging the scores of the
other four items (reliability was tested using Kuder-Richardson 20, a special case of Cronbach’s
alpha for binary data: pretest α = .61, posttest α = .69).
Contacting their senator. A measure of actual political behavior was included at the end
of the study. Participants in all conditions were mailed a thank you note from the researcher,
along with a postcard with the typed message, “This year, please vote for policies and laws
which will help slow climate change.” In the thank you note, participants were instructed that
they could use the postcard to contact their Senator about climate change if they wished. They
could fill-in a Senator to which they wanted to mail the postcard, sign their name, and were also
given space to write an optional note to the Senator. The postcards were addressed to the
researcher, and it was explained that all postcards would be collected by the researcher and
mailed as a package to the appropriate Senator. Whether or not participants mailed the postcard
served as a measure of political behavior.
Importance of climate-related issues. Political attitudes were first measured with a
political issue rating measure (adapted from Lacasse, 2015). Participants rated 10 different issues
on how important each was for the U.S. government to be currently addressing on a scale from 1
(Opposed to the issue) to 7 (Extremely important). They were specifically asked to vary the
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scores on different items so as to reduce the likelihood of ceiling effects. Two items were
averaged to make the climate-related issues scale: “Dealing with climate change” and
“Protecting the environment,” pretest r = .66, posttest r = .70.
Policy support. Political attitudes were also measured with a policy support measure
(adapted from Leiserowitz, Maibach, Roser-Renouf, & Smith, 2011). Participants received brief
explanations of seven different policies suggested to help reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Each
emissions-reducing policy was rated on a scale from 1 (Strongly oppose) to 5 (Strongly support),
and the seven items were averaged to make a scale, pretest α = .80, posttest α = .78.
Spillover mechanism measures.
Environmental responsibility. Participants’ sense of environmental responsibility
included four items about their perceived moral obligation to take action to address climate
change and their ability to make a difference. Participants responded to items on a scale from 1
(Strongly disagree) to 7 (Strongly agree), and responses were averaged to make a scale, pretest α
= .82, posttest α = .89.
Environmental centrality. Participants’ sense of environmental centrality included seven
items about personal identification with environmental and climate change issues. Some items
were adapted from an attitude strength centrality measure (Holland et al., 2002) with additional
identity items added. Participants responded to items on a scale from 1 (Strongly disagree) to 7
(Strongly agree), and responses were averaged to make a scale, pretest α = .89, posttest α = .92.
Factor analysis check: To ensure the discriminant validity of the two spillover
mechanism measures, an exploratory factor analysis was conducted including all 11 items from
the two measures. A principal-axis factor analysis was conducted with promax rotation with
Kaiser normalization. When using the criterion of eigenvalues greater than 1, two factors
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accounted for 56% of the total variance in the items. Items from the environmental centrality
measure loaded together on the first factor (.41 to .95), whereas the items from the environmental
responsibility measure loaded together on the second factor (.53 to .94). This confirmed that the
two measures could be used to measure separate spillover mechanisms.
Climate change belief. Belief in climate change was measured using the single item
“How likely do you think it is that climate change is occurring?” measured on a scale from 1
(Very likely occurring) to 5 (Very likely not occurring).
Social desirability scale. Social desirability was measured to use as a potential control
variable to determine whether it correlated with changes in participants’ response to other
questionnaire measures. The five-item SDRS-5, a short version of the social desirability scale, was
used (Hays, Hayashi, & Stewart, 1989). Items were averaged to make a scale, posttest α = .69.
Internal motivation. This measure was included to determine if behavior adoption
participants attributed their adopted PEB to their own internal motivation. The measure included
seven items from the larger Intrinsic Motivation Inventory (Ryan, 1982), and specifically
included items that measured perceived choice to perform the behavior (3 items), the value and
usefulness of the behavior (2 items), and effort exerted to perform the behavior well (2 items).
One of the perceived choice items (“I felt like I had to do the behavior”) was vague and did not
contribute to the reliability of the scale. Therefore, it was removed, and the remaining six items
were averaged to make a scale α = .76.
Procedure
Pretest questionnaire. Participants first completed the pretest questionnaire. The pretest
included a brief demographics form followed by all measures listed above except the social
desirability and internal motivation scales. A majority of participants completed the
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questionnaire online via Unipark survey tool (93%), and the rest requested a hard-copy, which
was mailed to their homes (7%).
Experimental manipulation. After the pretest questionnaire was completed, the
researcher scheduled a 15-minute phone meeting with each participant to take place within the
following week. The intention of the experimental manipulation was to make the control
condition as similar to the behavior adoption conditions as possible, with the only difference
being whether participants adopted a new PEB. Therefore, the control condition is not a “no
treatment” condition, but simply a condition in which participants did not commit to adoption of
a PEB. Participants in all conditions received a brief description of climate change and how
PEBs can reduce greenhouse gas emissions. The researcher also reminded each participant that
he/she performs some PEBs often and the three individual PEBs the participant had reported
doing most often were listed. Each participant was also told that he/she performs some PEBs less
often and three of the individual PEBs the participant had reported doing least often were listed.
The intention of listing both sets of behaviors was to avoid cueing participants one way or the
other. They were reminded that some of their past actions were environmental, but also that there
are still behaviors they could work on doing more often to become more environmentallyfriendly.
At this point, approximately one-third of the participants were randomly assigned to the
control condition. For this condition, the researcher explained that there are other things people
can do to “go green”, and three additional PEBs that were not included on any questionnaire
measure were listed to them. However, participants were not specifically asked to start adopting
any PEB. Participants were then thanked and reminded that they would receive the posttest
questionnaire in three weeks.
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The remaining participants were assigned to the BAM and BAC conditions. Participants
in these two conditions were asked if they would be willing to choose a PEB that they perform
infrequently and to work on doing it more often for the next three weeks. If the participant
agreed (only one participant declined and she dropped out by failing to complete the posttest
questionnaire), a list of possible PEBs was given for him/her to choose from. The list included all
behaviors the participant reported performing “Almost never”, “Occasionally”, or “Sometimes”
from the pretest individual PEB measure, along with 11 other PEBs that were not previously
listed. The list only included PEBs that could be performed multiple times a week such as “Use
reusable cloths, sponges, and towels instead of using paper towels” or “Avoid sudden
acceleration or sudden braking while driving.” The PEBs most commonly chosen for adoption
were unplugging appliances and chargers when not in use (16 participants), turning computer off
when finished using it (13 participants), and bringing their own bags to the store (7 participants).
Behavior adoption participants were told that a $5 donation would be made to the social
organization from which they were recruited regardless of their behavior change, and a reminder
was given that they could choose to adopt no PEB at all. The procedure was designed this way to
ensure participants did not choose a PEB they already performed regularly, to emphasize that the
purpose of the adopted behavior was to help the environment, and to clarify that participants had
a choice about which PEB to adopt and whether or not they chose to adopt a PEB at all.
These participants tracked how often they performed their adopted PEB over the threeweek span. Two different tracking methods were employed. BAM condition participants
responded to text messages they received every-other-day at various times-of-day and were
asked to indicate if they performed their adopted PEB on the most recent occasion they had the
opportunity (email messages were occasionally used for participants uncomfortable with text
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messages). This tracking method should lead to accurate responses by asking participants to
focus only on the most recent occasion, thereby reducing memory errors. BAC condition
participants used a self-report calendar every-other-day, reporting how many opportunities they
had to perform their adopted PEB that day as well as how many times they actually did the
behavior. The calendar method required greater memory of the day’s behaviors, but removed the
experimenter-initiated reminders and instead relied on participants’ self-initiation to track their
adoption of the PEB.
Posttest questionnaire. Three weeks later, all participants completed the posttest
questionnaire via online survey (or hard copy if requested). The posttest contained the same
measures from the pretest along with the social desirability scale, and BAM or BAC participants
also filled out the internal motivation scale regarding their adopted PEB.
Results
Initial Analyses
The responses of behavior adoption participants were examined to ensure that they felt
internally-motivated to perform their chosen behavior. Overall, high internal motivation was
demonstrated with participants scoring M = 6.00, SD = 0.75 and 92% of participants reporting
scores 5 or greater on a 7-point scale. Additionally, there was a marginally significant difference
between behavior adoption conditions in that BAC participants (M = 5.85, SD = 0.79) indicated
somewhat less motivation than the BAM participants (M = 6.14, SD = 0.69), t (84) = 1.84, p =
.07, d = 0.40.
Social desirability often influences participants’ self-report responses (van de Mortel,
2008), and climate change concern is often linked to political orientation in the U.S. (Shwom,
Bidwell, Dan, & Dietz, 2010). Therefore, Pearson’s correlations were calculated with these
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potential control variables and the PEB and political attitude measures to see if they should be
controlled for in further analyses (see Table 1). Due to the large number of tests (44 tests: 22
correlations for each control variable), the Bonferroni adjustment α = .001 was used. There were
not any significant correlations using this adjustment. When using the less stringent α = .10
without Bonferroni adjustment to look for marginally significant correlations, political
orientation was positively correlated with increased likelihood of installing a water conservation
product, increased likelihood of performing household PEBs, and negatively correlated with the
political behavior of contacting a senator. Social desirability was positively correlated with an
increase in recycling, unplugging appliances, taking a ten-minute shower, and bringing reusable
bags to stores. Therefore, political orientation and social desirability were used as control
variables when examining these specific spillover effects.
Comparing Experimental Conditions
A series of ANOVAs examined differences between those in the control condition, BAM
condition, and BAC condition on change in PEB or political attitude spillover measures from
pretest to posttest (see means and standard deviations on Table 2 and ANOVA tests on Table 3).
Due to the large number of tests (25 tests: 19 ANOVAs and 6 ANCOVAs with control
variables), the Bonferroni adjustment α = .002 was used. Contrary to Hypothesis 1, adopting a
new PEB did not show evidence of positive spillover in terms of individual PEBs, household
PEBs, self-reported political behavior, importance of climate-related issues, or policy support.
The three conditions did not demonstrate significant differences on any of the measures (even
when control variables were included) and ηp2 effect sizes ranged in absolute value from “no
effect” (<.0001) to small (.048). Eleven of the 19 tests had ηp2 < .01, and at most the different
experimental conditions accounted for 4.8% of the variance in change on the spillover measures.
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Additionally, the observed effects were not in the same direction (see Table 2). For some
spillover measures, the behavior adoption conditions increased more than the control condition,
but for others the control condition increased more, and in some cases the behavior adoption
conditions decreased.
One political behavior that did show a marked difference between conditions was
whether participants contacted their Senator. A logistic regression was conducted to examine
differences between conditions while controlling for political orientation. For this analysis, the
conditions were dummy coded with control condition = 0 and BAM condition and BAC
condition collapsed together into a behavioral adoption condition = 1. It found that behavior
adoption participants were 3.67 times more likely to mail the postcard (29%) than control
participants (13%), B = 1.30, SE B = 0.58, eB = 3.67, 95% CI for eB (1.18 to 11.41), χ2 (1, N =
114) = 5.80, p = .016. This offered partial support for Hypothesis 1.
Changes in the potential spillover mechanisms were also examined. Adopting a PEB for
three weeks did have some effect on environmental responsibility (see Tables 2 & 3). Using α =
.05, there was a significant difference between the conditions, and Tukey post-hoc tests indicated
that the BAM condition (M = +0.44, SD = 0.85) increased marginally more than the control
condition (M = +0.03, SD = 0.75), p = .05 and the BAC condition (M = +0.07, SD = 0.69), p =
.08), while the BAC and control condition did not differ (p = .83). However, there were no
significant differences between experimental conditions on environmental centrality.
Relationships between Spillover Mechanisms with PEB and Political Attitude Measures
The previous analysis found that the BAM condition increased in environmental
responsibility compared to the other two conditions. Therefore, to examine if adoption of a new
PEB in the BAM condition perhaps had an indirect positive spillover effect on PEB and political
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attitude measures through increased environmental responsibility, indirect effects analyses were
conducted using the PROCESS macro to SPSS (Hayes, 2013) using bootstrapping with 5,000
iterations. For this analysis, the experimental conditions were dummy coded with the control
condition and BAC condition collapsed together = 0 and BAM condition = 1. In support of
Hypothesis 2, there was a small, positive indirect effect of BAM condition on purchasing organic
or local produce through environmental responsibility (95% CI: 0.01 to 0.16), as well as a small,
positive indirect effect of BAM condition on policy support through environmental responsibility
(95% CI: 0.009 to 0.12). However, there was not a significant indirect effect of BAM condition
on change in any other PEB or political attitude measure. Due to the small size of the indirect
effects, the total effects of spillover from BAM condition to these two variables were small and
not statistically significant (produce: B = .05, p = .55; policy support: B = -.04, p = .69).
Although environmental centrality did not differ significantly between conditions,
correlations were run to examine whether increases in environmental centrality, regardless of
condition, were related to increases in the PEB and political attitude measures (see Table 1).
Change in environmental centrality tended to have small to moderate positive correlations with
increases in PEBs and attitudes, and using the Bonferroni adjustment α = .001, was significantly
positively correlated with increased likelihood of installing an item to make their home more
energy efficient. Additionally, change in environmental centrality had few small, negative
correlations.
Discussion
The results of this field experiment offer limited support for each hypothesis. In support
of Hypothesis 1, purposeful adoption of a PEB led to greater performance of a specific political
behavior while controlling for political orientation. Those who adopted a new PEB were more
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likely to contact their Senator about climate change when given an easy opportunity. As the one
behavioral assessment that is not a self-report measure in this study, this is an interesting finding.
It offers evidence that when people purposefully adopt a new individual PEB, their political
PEBs may expand as well. Since collective actions are often needed to persuade governments
and other institutions to make policy and infrastructure changes that will have large, lasting
impacts on emissions-reductions, positive spillover from individual PEBs into political PEBs
may be particularly useful for environmental policy makers to consider. Additionally, adopting a
new PEB and tracking that behavior via messaging had small, indirect positive spillover effects
on one individual PEB (purchasing local or organic produce) and one political attitude (policy
support) through increasing sense of environmental responsibility.
However, there was no other evidence that PEB adoption had a direct or indirect spillover
effect on people’s subsequent PEBs or political attitudes. PEB adoption did not make people
more or less likely to perform other individual PEBs or household PEBs and did not
meaningfully impact the importance they placed upon climate-related issues politically. Lack of
findings may be partially due to certain individual PEB measures with quite a few missing values
because participants who chose to adopt that PEB were removed from analysis for that PEB’s
spillover, lowering the sample size. Additionally, several individual PEBs displayed ceiling
effects, meaning that during pretest these behaviors were already performed very often (mean
score within one point of maximum score). This made it unlikely that positive spillover could
occur on these PEBs (see Table 2). However, this explanation does not address the lack of
evidence of positive spillover for the other PEBs and political attitudes that were not initially
skewed, nor does it explain the lack of evidence of negative spillover. Importantly, these findings
mirror the small and rather inconsistent positive spillover effects observed in other recent studies
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that examined how a PEB intervention spills over into subsequent PEBs (Lanzini & Thøgersen,
2014; Thomas et al., 2016).
There was also some moderate support for Hypothesis 2, in that BAM participants
increased in environmental responsibility, which in turn indirectly increased their purchasing of
local or organic produce and their support for emissions-reducing policies. This supports past
research that demonstrates environmental responsibility is a mechanism through which positive
spillover occurs (Steinhorst et al., 2015; van der Werff et al., 2013). This study was specifically
designed to ensure people felt internally-motivated to adopt a new PEB, which is important if the
PEB adoption is to strengthen the obligation felt to take action on environmental problems
(Lacasse, 2013; Truelove et al., 2014). The same outcome might not be observed if people feel
strong external pressure to adopt a behavior, or otherwise adopt the behavior for nonenvironmental reasons, since these contingencies often reduce motivation to perform PEBs (e.g.,
Evans et al., 2013; Lavergne, Sharp, Pelletier, & Holtby, 2010; Steinhorst et al., 2015; Steinhorst
& Matthies, 2016). However, the indirect effects were limited to these two behaviors, and BAC
participants who also adopted a PEB did not demonstrate similar effects.
Contrary to Hypothesis 2 and much previous research (Poortinga et al., 2013; van der
Werff et al., 2014a; 2014b), environmental centrality was not altered by PEB adoption. One
reason why environmental responsibility showed a greater effect may be because the
environmental responsibility items were more directly about obligation to perform PEBs, and the
environmental centrality items more broadly referred to personal identification with
environmental and climate change issues rather than environmental actions. Although PEB
adoption did not alter environmental centrality, those who did increase in environmental
centrality tended to show small increases in other PEBs and political attitudes, supporting past
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research linking identity to increased PEBs (Gatersleben et al., 2014; Whitmarsh & O’Neill,
2010). This finding also supports the notion that environmental responsibility is a more proximal
predictor of PEBs than environmental centrality (van der Werff et al., 2013).
Limitations and Future Directions
Behavior adoption participants each chose a PEB they wanted to integrate into their lives,
ensuring that participants felt the PEB adoption was the result of their own choice, had value to
them, and was worth putting effort into. However, a limitation of this purposeful adoption design
was that participants each chose their own PEB to adopt, and these adopted PEBs differed in
domain: food consumption, electricity conservation, waste prevention, and transportation. Since
PEB spillover is more likely to occur in related domains or among PEBs that require similar
resources (Margetts & Kashima, 2017), it is possible that some positive spillover occurred but
that the effects were spread across domains and not cumulatively large enough to be detected
within any one spillover measure (e.g., those who adopted PEB of eating meatless meals
increased in their purchasing of organic or local produce, but those who adopted PEBs in other
domains did not). Additionally, all adopted PEBs were relatively simple, but certain PEBs may
be more difficult or unique than others. Difficult and unique initial PEBs are sometimes found to
be more likely to lead to positive spillover (van der Werff et al., 2014a), but others find easy
PEBs can still spillover into difficult PEBs (Lauren, Fielding, Smith, & Louis, 2016).
Importantly, even relatively easy or common PEBs can serve as catalysts for positive spillover if
they are cued as “environmental” (Cornelissen et al., 2008), which was done in the current study.
Therefore, it is unclear if differences in difficulty or uniqueness in adopted PEBs would have
impacted the spillover effects observed in this study. Finally, the adopted PEBs also differed in
their degree of environmental impact in terms of emissions reductions. However, people tend to
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be rather inaccurate in their perceptions of which PEBs are more or less effective at actually
impacting the environment (Attari, DeKay, Davidson, & Bruine de Bruin, 2010), and so this
variability may not have had much impact on likelihood of spillover.
A strength of the current methodology was that it allowed the PEB to be realistically
integrated into participants’ daily lives over several weeks. A hurdle to this approach was
constructing a way to track participants’ PEB adoption without the measurement itself having an
influence on participants. To address this potential concern, two relatively common tracking
methods were chosen: One where people respond to a message from the researcher to report if
they performed the adopted PEB when they most recently had an opportunity (messaging in the
BAM condition) and one where people simply summarize their total performance of the adopted
PEB at the end of the day (calendar in the BAC condition). Although no differences between the
tracking methods were hypothesized, BAM participants reported a marginally greater change in
environmental responsibility than BAC participants. Interestingly, it seems that receiving
messages about the adopted PEB that required immediate responses increased feelings of
obligation beyond that of simply performing the adopted PEB. However, since both the style of
tracking and the behavior prompt differed in the two tracking methods, it is less clear which
specific aspect of the BAM tracking method led to this difference. Future research examining
PEBs should note that tracking via response to messages has the potential to alter posttest
responses, which may be problematic if the tracking itself is not part of the research question.
Lab studies or observational studies in which performance of the adopted PEB could be observed
without requiring self-report tracking would address this issue. Alternately, this type of
messaging could also be purposefully harnessed. With the rise in popularity of all kinds of
behavior tracking smartphone apps (e.g., steps walked, calories consumed, carbon footprint),
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these findings suggest that such programs with messages that require immediate responses about
people’s PEB adoption may likely be effective at boosting environmental responsibility. Further
research could specifically focus on the impact of PEB tracking itself without a specific PEB
adoption to determine whether the tracking alone strengthens environmental responsibility and
increases likelihood of positive spillover to future PEBs and/or political attitudes.
This study included a control condition in which participants were reminded of their past
PEBs and their past failures to perform PEBs so that the three experimental conditions were as
similar as possible with exception of the actual PEB adoption. Since cueing past behaviors as
environmental can induce increased subsequent PEBs (Cornelissen et al., 2008), it is possible
that spillover effects may have appeared stronger if behavior adoption conditions were compared
to a control condition in which participants were presented with no information at all, and this
should be examined in future work. In terms of measurement, one limitation of the study was
that three of the questionnaires displayed lower reliability (α between .60 - .70), and so future
work on designing stronger measures of climate-relevant political behaviors and of the
importance of climate-related issues would be beneficial. Additionally, this study was rather low
powered, partially due to participant dropout and removal that reduced the sample to 125 from
the initial 165, and partially due to the small effect sizes observed.
Generalizability of the study findings was also limited in several ways. Participants were
gathered from a variety of different social organizations that provided both male and female
participants, with a wide range of ages and different political orientations. However, most of the
participants were White and well-educated, both demographic groups that are more likely to
espouse environmental concern and to perform PEBs (e.g., Johnson, Bowker, & Cordell, 2004;
Laidley, 2013). Additionally, no conclusions can be drawn about how PEB adoption may
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influence people who are skeptical about the science of climate change, since those who
indicated climate change was not occurring were not included in this sample. Similarly,
Republicans, politically conservative individuals, and younger individuals were more likely to
drop out or be removed from the study, so the findings presented are more representative of the
spillover effects to be expected of older, liberal Democrats. Finally, the study was limited to
Massachusetts residents. Participants’ willingness to consider climate change as an issue of
political importance should be considered in the context of a more liberal-leaning U.S. region.
Future research on changes in political attitudes or actions after adopting PEBs should examine
more conservative U.S. regional contexts.
Conclusions
This study offers some evidence for small positive spillover effects and virtually no
evidence for negative spillover in a scenario in which people purposefully adopt a new PEB.
Since environmental responsibility increased after adoption among those responding to
messaging, it seems that, if anything, purposeful adoption of a new PEB is more likely to trigger
the sense of obligation to perform more PEBs rather than a heightened sense of environmental
centrality. The greatest impact was on likelihood of contacting their Senator, demonstrating that
individual PEBs can spillover into political PEBs. However, the positive spillover effects were
few and rather small. In sum, when someone works to change a behavior in his/her life to
become more environmentally friendly, it probably will not lead to a dramatic domino effect of
positive spillover. But it can’t hurt, and it might help.
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Table 1
Pearson’s Correlations Between Potential Controls, Spillover Mechanisms, and PEB & Political
Attitude Spillover Measures
Potential Controls
1.
2.
3.
4.
1. Political orientation
2. Social desirability
.06
Spillover Mechanisms
3. Δ Environmental centrality
-.02
-.01
4. Δ Environmental responsibility
.05
.06
.26**
Individual PEBs
Δ Recycle
.13
.19*
-.08
.11
Δ Turn off lights
.12
-.06
.01
.17†
Δ Unplug
-.06
.15†
.07
.08
Δ 10 min. shower
.01
.18†
.16†
.05
Δ Turn off TV
.07
-.02
.28**
.16†
Δ Reusable cup
-.02
.01
.06
.04
Δ Meatless
.03
.03
-.04
-.01
Δ Turn off computer
.11
.05
.07
.14
Δ Organic/local
.04
.06
.07
.29**
Δ Transportation
-.03
.01
.02
.06
†
Δ Layer on clothes
.15
.03
.16
.12
Δ Reusable bags
.02
.17†
-.05
.08
Household PEBs
Δ Household total
.18†
-.01
-.03
-.14
Δ Energy audit
-.06
.05
.16
.33**
Δ Efficiency
.04
.07
.40***
.02
Δ Reduce water
.32*
-.11
.35**
.18
Political PEBs & Attitudes
Δ Political behaviors
.04
.15
.11
.07
Δ Climate issues
.09
-.12
.23*
.11
Δ Policy support
.03
.08
.18*
.23*
Contact senator
-.27**
.01
-.11
-.14
Δ indicates a change variable (Score from posttest – Score from pretest); † p < .10, * p < .05, **
p < .01, *** p < .001; Bonferroni adjustment α = .001 for correlations with potential control
variables (column 1 & 2); Bonferroni adjustment α = .001 for correlations with spillover
mechanisms (column 3 & 4)
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Table 2
Means and Standard Deviations for Dependent Variables
Spillover Mechanisms
Environmental centrality
Environmental responsibility
Individual PEBs
Recycle
Turn off lights
Unplug
10 min. shower
Turn off TV
Reusable cup
Meatless
Turn off computer
Organic/local
Transportation
Layer on clothes
Reusable bags
Household PEBs
Household total
Energy audit
Efficiency
Reduce water
Political PEBs & Attitudes
Political behaviors
Importance of climate issues
Policy support

Pretest
Scores

Posttest
Scores

Δ Control
Condition

Δ BAM
Condition

Δ BAC
Condition

4.66
(1.16)
5.07
(1.14)

4.76
(1.13)
5.26
(1.10)

+0.17
(0.48)
+0.03
(0.75)

+0.19
(0.70)
+0.44
(0.85)

-0.07
(0.63)
+0.07
(0.69)

4.72a
(0.76)
4.55 a
(0.63)
3.24
(1.41)
4.11 a
(1.06)
4.34 a
(0.92)
4.02 a
(1.09)
4.14 a
(1.28)
3.39
(1.34)
3.40
(0.99)
2.35
(1.24)
4.17 a
(0.83)
3.48
(1.49)

4.74
(0.66)
4.56
(0.64)
3.44
(1.32)
4.25
(1.00)
4.39
(0.92)
4.06
(0.97)
4.02
(1.22)
3.58
(1.34)
3.42
(1.01)
2.34
(1.13)
4.28
(0.84)
3.62
(1.42)

-0.03
(0.28)
-0.10
(0.68)
-0.05
(0.07)
+0.16
(0.89)
+0.21
(0.66)
0.00
(1.03)
0.00
(0.76)
-0.05
(0.84)
-0.05
(0.83)
-0.11
(0.76)
+0.28
(0.76)
0.00
(0.52)

+0.02
(0.46)
+0.07
(0.63)
-0.16
(1.20)
+0.09
(0.76)
+0.02
(0.87)
+0.03
(1.11)
-0.34
(0.78)
+0.22
(0.99)
+0.07
(0.75)
0.00
(0.93)
-0.07
(0.96)
-0.07
(0.61)

+0.02
(0.35)
+0.05
(0.61)
+0.07
(0.94)
+ 0.10
(0.91)
-0.13
(0.80)
-0.13
(0.85)
0.00
(0.97)
-0.18
(1.09)
+0.08
(0.62)
+0.08
(0.81)
+0.15
(0.65)
+0.21
(0.93)

3.26
(1.27)
3.92
(1.55)
4.56
(1.42)
4.24
(1.64)

3.29
(1.17)
4.29
(1.61)
4.36
(1.63)
4.43
(1.52)

+0.05
(0.79)
-0.09
(1.06)
-0.21
(1.21)
+0.29
(0.90)

+0.06
(0.68)
+0.30
(1.20)
0.00
(1.35)
+0.05
(0.95)

-0.01
(0.69)
+0.24
(0.93)
-0.15
(1.35)
+0.40
(1.59)

0.37
(0.27)
5.34
(1.17)
3.67
(0.76)

0.39
(0.29)
5.24
(1.14)
3.77
(0.69)

+0.04
(0.16)
-0.07
(0.70)
+0.08
(0.38)

+0.01
(0.16)
-0.04
(0.80)
+0.10
(0.41)

+0.01
(0.13)
-0.14
(0.60)
+0.15
(0.39)

Means are listed on top and standard deviations are in parentheses below. Δ indicates a change
variable (Score from posttest – Score from pretest). a indicates that pretest score displayed a
ceiling effect (negatively skewed).
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Table 3
Comparing Experimental Conditions on Dependent Variables
ANOVAs of Spillover Mechanisms
Δ Environmental centrality
Δ Environmental responsibility
ANOVAs of Individual PEBs
Δ Recycle
Δ Turn off lights
Δ Unplug
Δ 10 min. shower
Δ Turn off TV
Δ Reusable cup
Δ Meatless
Δ Turn off computer
Δ Organic/local
Δ Transportation
Δ Layer on clothes
Δ Reusable bags
ANOVAs of Household PEBs
Δ Household total
Δ Energy audit
Δ Efficiency
Δ Reduce water
ANOVAs of Political PEBs & Attitudes
Δ Political behaviors
Δ Climate issues
Δ Policy support
ANCOVAs of Individual PEBs
Δ Recycle model
Control: Social desirability
Experimental condition
Δ Unplug model
Control: Social desirability
Experimental condition
Δ 10 min. shower model
Control: Social desirability
Experimental condition
Δ Reusable bags model
Control: Social desirability
Experimental condition
ANCOVAs of Household PEBs
Δ Reduce water model
Control: Political orientation
Experimental condition
Δ Household behaviors model
Control: Political orientation.
Experimental condition

F

dfb

dfw

p

ηp2

2.09
3.48

2
2

117
117

.13
.03

.03
.06

0.23
0.87
0.39
0.07
1.77
0.26
2.32
1.56
0.37
0.45
2.00
1.69

2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2

119
117
103
119
120
115
119
105
120
119
122
114

.79
.42
.68
.93
.18
.77
.10
.22
.69
.64
.14
.19

<.01
.02
<.01
<.01
.03
<.01
.04
.03
<.01
<.01
.03
.03

0.08
0.89
0.16
0.48

2
2
2
2

85
71
70
55

.93
.42
.85
.62

<.01
.02
<.01
.02

0.56
0.22
0.29
F
1.74
4.50
0.50
1.82
2.47
1.30
1.31
3.73
0.03
1.83
3.31
0.91

2
2
2
dfb
3
1
2
3
1
2
3
1
2
3
1
2

118
118
118
dfw
118
118
118
118
118
118
119
119
119
118
118
118

.57
.80
.75
p
.16
.04
.61
.15
.12
.28
.28
.06
.97
.15
.07
.40

<.01
<.01
<.01
ηp2
.04
.04
<.01
.04
.02
.02
.03
.03
<.01
.04
.03
.02

2.97
7.78
1.30
1.11
2.95
0.30

3
1
2
3
1
2

52
52
52
80
80
80

.04
.007
.28
.35
.09
.74

.15
.13
.05
.04
.04
<.01

Δ indicates a change variable (Score from posttest – Score from pretest). Bonferroni adjustment
α = .002 for tests on PEB or political attitude spillover measures.
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Figure 1: Illustration of the experimental design: Indicates the timeline during which the experiment occurred (see timeline at bottom
of image) and explains the procedures for participants in the three different experimental conditions.
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APPENDIX A

Table 1A
Items on Questionnaire Measures
Individual Pro-Environmental Behavior Items
1) Recycle items of plastic, glass, paper, and cans
2) Turn the lights off each time I leave an empty room
3) Unplug small appliances and chargers from the wall when they are not in use
4) Take showers which last for 10 minutes or less
5) Turn off the T.V. each time I leave an empty room
6) Use my own reusable drinking container each time I get water, coffee, or other beverages
7) Eat at least one meal without meat (beef, pork, chicken, seafood, etc.) a day
8) Turn my computer fully off when I am not using it
9) Purchase organic or local produce
10) Instead of driving separately, carpool or take public transportation
11) Put more clothes on when I feel cold, rather than turning up the heat
12) Bring my own bags to use when shopping for groceries or other items
Household Pro-Environmental Behavior Items
1) Request an energy audit to find out how to make your home more energy efficient
2) Switch to renewable electricity through your electricity provider (NSTAR Green, New England
GreenStart, etc.)
3) Install a renewable energy system (solar panels, wind turbine, etc.) for your home
4) Purchase a low-emission motor vehicle (hybrid, electric, biofuel)
5) Install an item to make your house more energy efficient (insulation, new heating system, etc.)
6) Purchase a product to reduce water usage in your home (low-flush toilet, low-flow shower head,
etc.)
Political Behavior Items
1) Discussed climate change with family or friends in an informal setting
2) Belonged to an organization concerned with climate change
3) Gave money to an organization which works on the issue of climate change
4) Wrote a letter to a public official or newspaper expressing my view on climate change
5) Participated in a protest, rally, or other kind of public demonstration about climate change (item
removed)
Importance of Climate-Related Issues Items
1) Strengthening the nation’s economy
2) Improving the educational system
3) Dealing with climate change (used in climate-related issues scale)
4) Defending the country from future terrorist attacks
5) Improving the job situation
6) Dealing with the nation’s energy problem
7) Reducing health care costs
8) Dealing with the issue of illegal immigration
9) Reducing federal income taxes for the middle class
10) Protecting the environment (used in climate-related issues scale)
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Policy Support Items
1) Provide tax rebates for people who purchase energy-efficient vehicles
2) Require electric utilities to produce at least 20% of their electricity from wind, solar, or other
renewable energy sources, even if it costs the average household an extra $100 a year initially
3) Sign an international treaty that requires the United States to cut its emissions of carbon dioxide
90% by the year 2050
4) Constructing bike paths and installing bike lanes on city streets
5) Regulations requiring any new home to be more energy efficient: this would increase the initial
cost by about $7,500 but save $17,000 in utility bills over 30 years
6) Changing your county’s zoning rules to require that neighborhoods have a mix of housing,
offices, schools, and stores close together, to encourage walking and decrease the need for a car
7) A 10-cent fee added to each gallon of gasoline you buy, to improve local public transportation
Environmental Responsibility Items
1) I feel morally obligated to do what I can to prevent climate change
2) It is important for me to do my part, and change my personal behaviors to help slow climate
change
3) Going green is an alternative lifestyle, which is for some people, but not for me *rev
4) Changing personal behaviors won't make any difference in slowing down climate change *rev
Environmental Centrality Items
1) I consider myself a climate-concerned person
2) I consider myself ‘green’
3) I consider myself an environmentalist
4) Climate change is an important issue to me personally (adapted from Holland et al., 2002)
5) I am certain about my opinions regarding climate change (adapted from Holland et al., 2002)
6) My attitude towards climate change is central to who I am (adapted from Holland et al., 2002)
7) My attitude towards climate change represents my personally important values (adapted from
Holland et al., 2002)
Social Desirability Items
1) I sometimes try to get even rather than forgive and forget. *rev
2) No matter who I’m talking to, I’m always a good listener
3) There have been occasions when I took advantage of someone. *rev
4) I sometimes feel resentful when I don’t get my way. *rev
5) I am always courteous even to people who are disagreeable.
Internal Motivation Items
1) I believe I had some choice about doing this behavior.
2) I felt like I had to do this behavior. *rev (item removed)
3) I did this behavior because I wanted to.
4) I think that doing this behavior is useful for reducing my impact on the climate and environment.
5) I would be willing to continue doing this behavior because it has some value to me.
6) It was important to me to do well at this behavior.
7) I didn’t try very hard to do this behavior. *rev
*rev indicates that the item was reverse-scored before averaging the scale

